We introduce a new matching model in which firms trade goods via bilateral contracts which specify a buyer, a seller, and the terms of the exchange. This framework subsumes all classical matching models, including that of Ostrovsky [5] . The generality our model affords allows us to make two substantial contributions.
• full substitutability -upon being endowed with an additional item, an agent's demand for other items is lower, both in the sense of a reduced desire to buy additional items and an increased desire to sell items he currently owns.
1
If either condition is violated, then existence of stable allocations cannot be guaranteed. 2 Intuitively, if a contracting relationship contains a cycle, and if a firm in the cycle has an outside option which is preferred to one contract in the cycle, then both the outside option and the complete trading cycle are unstable; the necessity of acyclicity follows. The * The authors appreciate the helpful comments of Drew Fu- 1 Full substitutability is a condition on firms' preferences familiar from auction theory. Indeed, full substitutability is an ordinal analog of the conventional notion of substitutes from auction theory (see, for instance, [4] ) and we prove more formally that it is equivalent to quasisubmodularity of the associated indirect utility function. 2 Note that we use a notion of stability which is distinct from chain stability introduced by Ostrovsky [5] . Our stability concept is more stringent than chain stability, although these two notions coincide on acyclic contract domains over which firm preferences are fully substitutable.
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Second, in the presence of acyclicity and fully substitutable preferences, we fully generalize the key results of classical matching theory. We prove that under these conditions stable allocations correspond bijectively to fixed points of an isotone operator; Tarski's fixed point theorem then guarantees the existence of a lattice of stable allocations. We also prove a generalization of the classical rural hospitals theorem of Roth [6] and the strategy-proofness results of Hatfield and Milgrom [3] and Hatfield and Kojima [1] .
3 These latter results display a surprising structure which can only be elicited within a framework as general as ours: in particular, we show that the difference between the numbers of buyand sell-contracts held, rather than the absolute number of contracts held, is invariant across stable allocations for each agent.
In light of our necessity results, our work establishes a frontier of matching theory. Without acyclicity and fully substitutable preferences, stable allocations are not guaranteed to exist in general, and hence the results of classical matching theory fail. Up to the failure of these conditions, however, all of the results of classical matching theory hold. 
